FROM BOSNIA TO KOSOVO AND EAST TIMOR:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORY
Ralph Wilde*
In recent years there has been a resurgence in projects where territorial
units are administered by international organizations. In Bosnia and
Hercegovina ('Bosnia'), Kosovo and East Timor, international organizations
have been given wide powers of administration, covering a broad range of
activities. I am currently undertaking a study of this phenomenon, what I term
'International Territorial Administration' (ITA). Today, I would like to make
some observations on the role of the United Nations in creating and carrying out
the administration projects in these three territories.
With respect to Bosnia, the starting point is the General Framework
Agreement of 1995, collectively known as the Dayton Agreement.' Annex 10
of the Dayton Agreement established the Office of the High Representative
(OHR), with responsibility for the implementation of civil administration in
Bosnia.2 The civilian role of OHR is complemented by the military role of the
NATO-led body, called at first the Implementation Force (IFOR), and later the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Annex 1-A of Dayton invites the Security Council
to establish IFOR, effectively granting the force total military control in
Bosnia.'
The Dayton Agreement also allocates further aspects of Bosnia's
administration to other international actors, from the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) being requested to set up and run the
electoral system, 4 to three members of the Constitutional Court being appointed
by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.5
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1.
Bosnia and Hercegovina - Croatia - Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Hercegovina with Annexes, Dec 14,1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
2.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 147.
3.
Id. at 92.
4.
Id.at 115.
5.
Id. at 118.
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The formal participants in the Dayton Agreement and the Annexes vary
between the different instruments, being drawn from Bosnia, Croatia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the two Entities that make up
Bosnia. A common theme, however, is that the relationship between these
participants, on the one hand, and the subject matter of the Dayton Agreement,
on the other, is incongruous. Only a small part of the Dayton Agreement is
concerned with the obligations interse of the formal participants, for example
refraining from the use of force.6 Most of the Dayton Agreement sets out how
Bosnia and its two Entities will function internally and the powers of
international organizations over this. None of the organizations involved are
formal participants, apart from two limited areas. First, Annex 1-B is a series
of agreements "between" NATO and Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and the
FRY.7 It is notable that, unlike the other Annexes, the status of the formal
participants, such as being "parties," is not specified. Annex 1-B is.
comparatively minor, covering matters ancillary to the main powers outlined in
Annex 1-A, to which NATO is not a party.' Second, SFOR and OHR, despite
not being parties to the Annexes that set out their main powers, are each given
final authority in theatre to interpret the provisions of their respective Annex.9
Sweeping powers, and the final authority in theatre to interpret these powers,
are therefore given to international organizations that are not parties to the
agreements that give them these powers. A further peculiarity is that one of
these organizations, OHR, is not only empowered, but also created by the
relevant agreement.°
The legal authority for the arrangements in Bosnia and Hercegovina does
not stop at the Dayton Agreement. In Resolution 1031 of December 15, 1995,
the Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, supports the Dayton Agreement
and in particular OHR and SFOR's prerogatives. 1" It also authorizes the
establishment of SFOR.' 2 This Resolution thereby realizes the Dayton
Agreement's invitation to authorize a military force 13 and makes certain
provisions of the Dayton Agreement binding as a matter of Security Council
law, in addition to their status in treaty law.

6.
Id. at 92.
7.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 109.
8.
Id. at 92.
9.
Id. at 100, 148.
10. Id. at 147.
11.
United Nations: Report of the Secretary General on the Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR
and Addendum on Cost Estimates, Including Security Council Resolutions 1031 (1995) and 1035 (1995),
Addressing the Political Settlement in the Former Yugoslavia and the Transfer of Power from UNPROFOR
to IFOR December 13-21, 1995, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 235 (1996) [hereinafter Resolution 1031].
12.
Id. at 253.
13.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 92.
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Turning to the international administration in Kosovo, the starting point
is the Peace Plan of June 3, 1999 (Peace Plan). 4 The FRY and the Republic
of Serbia agree to the deployment of an international civil and security
presence, authorized under Chapter 7.V' Like most of the Dayton Agreement
Annexes, the Peace Plan is a one-sided acceptance of international
administration by host country actors, without the participation of those
organizations that will carry out this administration. However, a separate
agreement was made between KFOR, the FRY and the Republic of Serbia on
June 9, 1999, authorizing in some detail the plenary occupation and control of
Kosovo by KFOR (KFOR Agreement).' 6 Unlike in Bosnia, therefore, the
military force is a party to the main agreement delineating its powers. 7
The terms of both the Peace Plan and the KFOR Agreement make the
arrangements they contain dependent on authorization by the Security
Council. 8 This came in Resolution 1244, passed on June 10, 1999." 9 The
Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, endorses the Peace Plan and
welcomes the KFOR Agreement. 20 It also authorizes the establishment of an
international security force and elaborates on the powers of this force. 2' Here,
as with Bosnia, the Security Council reinforces existing obligations, and creates
new obligations regarding a military force. The difference is that in addition
to this, it authorizes the Secretary General to establish an international civil
presence, now called UNMIK, and sets out in full the powers of this presence. 2
The role of the United Nations is even more pronounced in the East Timor
administration project. In Resolution 1272, passed on October 25, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter 7, established the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, (UNTAET).23 In the words of the resolution,
14.
Letter Dated 7 June 1999 From the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United
Nations Addressedto the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/649
(1999) <http://www.un.orgtpeace/kosovols 1999649.pdf> (Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move
towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, 3 June 1999) [hereinafter Peace Plan].
15.
Id. at art. 3.
16.
Military-technicalAgreement Between the InternationalSecurity Force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/682 (1999) <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s99682.pdf> [hereinafter KFOR Agreement].
17.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 92.
18.
Peace Plan, supra note 14; KFOR Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 1.2.
19.
G.A. Res. 1244, U.N. Security Council, 4011 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
<http://www.un.org/Docstscres/1999/99sc1244.htm> [Hereinafter "Resolution 1244"].
20.
ld. at arts. 1-2, 5.
21.
Id. at arts. 7, 9.
22.
Id. at arts. 6, 10, 11.
23.
G.A. Res. 1272, U.N. Security Council, 4057 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1272 (1999)
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/9931277E.htm> [hereinafter Resolution 1272].
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UNTAET is given "overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor
and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority."'24
Strikingly, the mission includes its own military component, with a "strength
of up to 8,950 troops."'2
Taking the three projects together, we can see a shift in the role played by
the United Nations. As for creating the projects with Bosnia, the Security
Council played a secondary role, essentially giving the Dayton Agreement its
seal of approval. With Kosovo, it determined more of the project itself,
especially the civil component. With East Timor, Resolution 1272 is the main
legal authority for all aspects of the project. Of course, with Bosnia and
Kosovo the states who used diplomatic means to trigger the formal legal
processes were largely the same. The Contact Group countries who brokered
the Dayton Agreement were also instrumental in the adoption of the Kosovo
Peace Plan, the KFOR Agreement, and Resolution 1244.26 The change as
between Bosnia and Kosovo was that these states channeled their diplomatic
efforts much more through the United Nations legal system than through ad hoc
legal processes.
Differences in the legal processes setting up the projects mirror changes
in the actors carrying them out. As for the civil component, in Bosnia and
Hercegovina the main role is performed by a sui generisentity. By contrast, in
Kosovo and East Timor it is controlled by the United Nations. As for the
military component, in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosovo this is conducted
by an international force authorized by the Security Council. It is only in East
Timor that the United Nations takes on the military component of
administration itself.
I would make three observations on this renewed role for the United
Nations.
Having such international administration projects authorized through the
Security Council may be a positive development. An important objective of
international administration is, of course, to assist a particularly weak territorial
entity. When this is effected through a treaty signed by the entity concerned,
the weakness of this entity renders consent meaningful particularly in a narrow,
formal sense. In a more general sense, international administration projects are
imposed. Given this, such projects should be legally authorized through a
24.
Id. at art. 1.
25.
Id. at art. 9.
The Contact Group is made up of the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, the United
26.
Kingdom and the United States. These countries appear as 'witnesses' to the Dayton Agreement, supra note
1. The Peace Plan, was negotiated by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European
Union, and Viktor Chemomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, supra
note 14. NATO, whose members include France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States,
signed the KFOR Agreement, supra note 16.
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process with the power of unilateral imposition, namely the Security Council
acting under Chapter 7. Furthermore, the changing nature of an administration
project requires a regulatory regime that operates flexibly. In this respect, the
comparatively quick process of adopting Security Council resolutions compares
favorably with the cumbersome process of treaty-making and revision.
However, the fact that the United Nations both authorizes and carries out
international administration projects is a mixed blessing. The Security Council
scrutinizes keenly those operations that are set up and run by the United
Nations. At the same time, concentrating the creation, conduct and regulation
of international administration through one actor raises concerns about the
efficacy of checks and balances, even given the constitutional and political
differences between the Security Council and United Nations missions.
Finally, it is too early to tell whether the United Nations will succeed in
carrying out its responsibilities in Kosovo and East Timor. For some, a
multilateral institution is the appropriate actor for the conduct of this activity,
and the United Nations brings a wealth of experience and expertise. Those with
a less favorable view of the United Nations would prefer sui generis and/or,
regional organizations to carry out international administration projects. It
remains to be seen whether the United Nations can fulfill what are two of the
most ambitious mandates it has ever been given. The role the United Nations
plays in future administration projects, and indeed whether future
administrative projects are created, depends largely on what happens in Kosovo
and East Timor.

